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MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT: CURRENT 
PROBLEMS, AUGUSTINIAN PROSPECTS. By Graham Walker. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990. Pp. ix, 189. $25. 
Many of the central controversies in contemporary constitutional 
thought concern the proper relationship of law and morality. Advo-
cates of judicial restraint - adopting what is sometimes termed "con-
ventionalism" or "positivism" - argue that judges should avoid 
injecting their moral views into constitutional analysis. 1 Critics of this 
approach - often supporting more activist judicial policies - argue 
that moral considerations are essential to legal analysis in general and 
constitutional interpretation in particular.2 
In his book, Moral Foundations of Constitutional Thought, Gra-
ham Walker, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, uses Augustinian philosophy to resolve what he 
characterizes as the "normative impasse" implicit in current constitu-
tional theory. Walker takes the innovative tack of using moral argu-
ments to justify the partial exclusion of moral considerations from 
constitutional questions. In this project he enlists the aid of Augus-
tine, whom he contends "provides deeply nonpositivist grounds for an 
almost positivist vision of law" (p. 7). Ultimately, Walker's critique of 
current constitutional thought is more successful than his application 
of Augustinian philosophy to contemporary constitutional problems. 
Nevertheless, his attempt to establish a moral basis for conventional-
ism and judicial restraint suggests some valuable new lines of analysis, 
especially for legal conservatives dissatisfied with the morally ambigu-
ous positivism of Robert Bork and others. 
The most successful part of Walker's analysis is his critique of con-
temporary constitutional thought. Initially, he contends that, because 
theories of constitutional analysis are inherently prescriptive, such the-
ories must imply some basic normative background. Constitutional 
1. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTII AMENDMENT (1977); R. Boll, TRAI>mON AND MORALITY IN CoNSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1984); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1 (1971); Rehnquist, Government by Cliche: Keynote Address of the Earl F. Nelson Lecture 
Series, 45 Mo. L. REv. 379 (1980); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution. 54 TEXAS L. 
REV. 693 (1976). 
Identifying judicial restraint with "conventionalism" and "positivism" is somewhat problem-
atic. For example, H. Hart's legal positivism, with its insistence on the separation of law and 
morality, is related to the judicial restraint scholarship but less prescriptive in its conclusions. 
See H. HART, THE CoNCEFT OF LAW 206 (1961) (arguing for the definitional separation oflaw 
and morality, but noting that "the certification of something as legally valid is not conclusive of 
the question of obedience," since legal rules "must in the end be submitted to a moral scrutiny"). 
2. See, e.g, L. TRIBE, CoNSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 5 (1985); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958). Contemporary "moral real-
ists" also fall into this category. See infra text accompanying note 14. 
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analysis cannot "suspend itself in midair, independent of any substan-
tive political morality"; it must be justified by some reference to higher 
principles of the good (pp. 9-10). This normative element is especially 
clear in the unapologetically moral language of the fifth, eighth, and 
fourteenth amendments (p. 11 ). 
However, according to Walker, most contemporary constitutional 
theorists engage in "normative evasions" (p.13). Former federal judge 
Robert Bork, for example, advocates a conventionalist approach to 
constitutional theory which rejects any investigation of transcendent 
moral questions.3 Bork argues that courts should "let the majority 
have its way" in moral controversies since there is "no principled 
way" for judges to distinguish competing moral claims.4 He bases this 
approach on the skeptical conclusion that moral considerations are 
mere "forms of gratification."5 Walker criticizes Bork for adopting a 
form of nihilist skepticism and setting up the majority will as a "con-
ventional surrogate for a real morality" (p. 14). Walker contends that 
since Bork's theories of interpretation (Framers' intent) and of adjudi-
cation (judicial restraint) are ultimately prescriptive, these theories 
must be justified by an appeal to moral and political philosophy. By 
rejecting the possibility of real moral standards, Bork thus undermines 
his own project. 
Walker argues that similar philosophical inconsistencies afflict 
many ostensibly nonpositivist constitutional scholars. Professor Lau-
rence Tribe, for example, while admitting that substantive moral anal-
ysis is unavoidable in constitutional analysis, 6 concludes that the 
search for real moral truths is "[f]utile."7 Walker contends that this 
moral nihilism makes Tribe's advocacy of various causes and constitu-
tional interpretations untenable (p. 16). Walker examines the work of 
other constitutional scholars, including John Hart Ely, Michael Perry, 
and Lief Carter, 8 and concludes that each fails to provide an adequate 
3. See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); Bork, supra note 1, at 10. 
4. Bork, supra note 1, at 10. 
5. Id. Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist argues for legal positivism on the grounds that 
fundamental moral principles cannot be "logically demonstrate[d]." Rehnquist, The Notion of a 
Living Constitution, supra note 1, at 704. This kind of skepticism and deference to majority rule 
may have its earlier roots in the writings of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. See, e.g. O.W. 
HOLMES, Natural Law, in CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310 (1920) (reaffirming his statement 
that "truth was the majority vote of the nation that could lick all others"). 
6. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 4 (affirming his belief "that constitutional interpretation is a 
practice alive with choice but laden with content; and that this practice has both boundaries and 
moral significance not wholly reducible to, although never independent of, the ends for which it 
is deployed"). 
7. Id. at 3. Tribe writes, "I genuinely believe ••• [in] the ultimate futility of the quest for an 
Archimedean point outside ourselves from which the legitimacy of some form of judicial review 
or constitutional exegesis may be affirmed." Id. at 5. 
8. See, e.g., L. CARTER, CoNTEMPORARY CoNSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING: THE SUPREME 
CoURT AND THE ART OF PoLmcs (1985); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OP 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); M. PERRY, MORALITY, PoLmcs, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL 
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moral basis for constitutional thought {pp. 34-40). Instead, these theo-
rists, in one way or another, reduce morality to a "socially fabricated 
convention" {p. 17) without any independent reality.9 
Walker has the most problems characterizing the thought of Pro-
fessor Ronald Dworkin.10 At first, Walker characterizes Dworkin's 
"law as integrity" model from Law's Empire as an elaborated form of 
"softer" conventionalism {p. 43). According to Walker, Dworkin ap-
pears merely to construe existing moral and legal conventions in their 
best light without reference to transcendent, ahistorical truths {pp. 43-
44). Walker's suspicions here are understandable given the ambivalent 
treatment of nihilist skepticism in Law's Empire. 11 Nonetheless, 
Dworkin's approach to legal interpretation explicitly contains both a 
"fit" element dependent on past legal decisions and a "justification" 
element tied to higher issues of "political morality."12 Walker eventu-
ally acknowledges that Dworkin's theory "impl[ies] some basis in real, 
not just conventional, morality" {p. 44). Nevertheless, Walker's con-
ceptual problems with Dworkin ultimately prevent him from appreci-
ating the fundamental similarities between his "Augustinian" 
approach to constitutional law and Dworkin's "law as integrity" 
model. 13 
Overall, Walker concludes that most mainstream constitutional 
theorists, with the possible exception of Ronald Dworkin, adopt one 
form or another of moral nihilism, eschewing any attempt to justify 
their positions on the basis of real moral truths. This nihilism, how-
ever, undermines the prescriptive claims made by these same theorists. 
Walker persuasively argues that these contemporary scholars are left 
in an intellectual and moral dead end, paralyzed by their own relativ-
ism ·{pp. 61-64). 
But what viable alternatives to these conventional approaches ex-
ist? One group of "moral realist" thinkers, such as Michael S. Moore, 
Sotirious Barber, and John Courtney Murray, S.J., argue that courts 
should explicitly base constitutional analysis on transcendent moral 
principles.14 Though they differ on certain assumptions, all three con-
EssAY (1988); Perry, Moral Knowledge, Moral Reasoning, Moral Relativism: A ''Naturalist" Per-
spective, 20 GA. L. REV. 995 (1986). 
9. Walker argues that the adherents of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement make the 
same mistake, advocating radical goals on moral grounds, while simultaneously denying the pos-
sibility of transcendent truths. According to Walker, these scholars fail to realize that their 
nihilism undercuts the justifications for their radicalism. For examples of CLS scholarship, see 
R. UNGER, THE CRmcAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Lib-
eral Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411 (1981). 
10. See generally R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SE-
RIOUSLY (1977). 
11. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 10, at 78-83. 
12. Id. at 254-56. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 18, 28. 
14. See generally s. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CoNSTITUTION MEANS (1984); J. MURRAY, 
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tend that the good has a real existence beyond mere convention and 
that humans have the ability to apprehend the good, at least to some 
degree. 
Walker contends that these theories provide a substantial improve-
ment over conventionalism because they acknowledge the explicitly 
moral character of constitutional interpretation and, more generally, 
provide a firmer normative basis for legal analysis (p. 57). Neverthe-
less, moral realism, by essentially eliminating the distinction between 
law and morality, raises the specter of unchecked judicial activism and 
even tyranny.15 Moral realists such as Moore respond that their ideal 
judge would still place a high practical value on precedent, consistency 
and the rule of law,16 but Walker finds these "epistemological dis-
claimers" unpersuasive, given Moore's activist agenda.17 
Thus, although he does not explicitly admit it, Walker faces a 
choice similar to that of Dworkin in Law,s Empire. On the one hand, 
conventionalism provides an inadequate normative basis for legal deci-
sionmaking and coercion. On the other hand, moral realism (what 
Dworkin calls "pragmatism"18) collapses the distinction between law 
and morality to the point where law becomes merely the ''judge's own 
best current theory of goodness" (p. 146). Such an approach fails to 
address the problem of moral indeterminacy or restrain the potential 
for judicial abuse. The inadequacy of these alternatives produces what 
Walker calls a "normative impasse" (pp. 61-64). How can one provide 
an adequate moral basis for legal decisionmaking while still preserving 
the notion of law qua law? 
Walker suggests that the philosophy of Augustine, the fourth- and 
fifth-century Catholic scholar and saint, may provide an answer. 19 
According to Walker, Augustine addresses a philosophical dilemma 
similar to the contemporary normative impasse in constitutional 
thought. The normative impasse of antiquity pitted the nihilism of the 
Manichaeans and Academic Skeptics against the utopian moralism of 
WE HOLD THEsE TRUTHS: CATIIOLIC REFLECTIONS ON TIIE AMERICAN PROPOSmON (1960); 
Barber, Epistemological Skepticism, Hobbesian Natural Right, and Judicial Self-Restraint, 48 
REv. POL. 374 (1986); Barber, The New Right Assault on Moral Inquiry in Constitutional Law, 
54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 253 (1986); Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Legal Theory (Book 
Review), 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 453 (1987); Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation. 58 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985). 
15. For example, Michael Moore argues that judges, when confronted by hard cases, should 
ultimately follow their own moral convictions instead of conventional mores. See Moore, A Nat-
ural Law Theory of Interpretation, supra note 14, at 388-96. 
16. See id. at 313-18, 358-76. 
17. According to Walker, Moore "effects a practical fusion of law and morality and recom-
mends a judicial moral activism whose only constraint is its own prudence." P. 54. 
18. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 10, at 151-75. 
19. As a preliminary matter, Walker assures his readers that they need not embrace Augus-
tine's theology in order to benefit from "the intellectual exercise" of his book. Pp. 7-8. The 
problems and limitations presented by Walker's reliance on Augustine's theology are discussed 
infra at note 27 and accompanying text. 
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the classical philosophers and the Pelagian heretics. 20 In his writings, 
Augustine rejects both of these altematives.21 
First, Augustine contends that fundamental principles of goodness 
exist and that man can understand, if only imperfectly, these princi-
ples (p. 94). Thus, Augustine rejects the Manichaeans and skeptics of 
his time who regarded reality as fundamentally void or evil. Walker, 
in turn, employs Augustine's arguments for the possibility of true 
knowledge of the good to refute the nihilist skepticism of contempo-
rary constitutional scholars (pp. 116-24). 
Second, Augustine also rejects the utopian moralism of classical 
philosophy as unable to account for the experience of indeterminacy. 
Augustine argues that, as a consequence of the Biblical Fall, man and 
nature are fundamentally flawed (pp. 84-86). This deficiency renders 
all human knowledge partially indeterminate and unstable. Thus, the 
experience of indeterminacy is not merely an epistemological problem, 
but is rather an ontological problem tied to the inherently flawed char-
acter of man and nature (pp. 96-97). According to Augustine, classi-
cal philosophy, with its search for transcendent principles in nature, 
cannot account for these fundamental deficiencies. 
Augustine's ontological insights lead him to characterize history as 
the story of two cities: the City of God and the City of Man (pp. 100-
05). The citizens of the City of God attempt to order their lives in 
accord with divine revelation and the true good. The citizens of the 
earthly city (often identified with Babylon and Rome) seek out various 
surrogates for God in personal affections and passions. In Augustine's 
philosophy, neither of these cities exists as a particular political state; 
rather, both are intermingled in every sphere of life. Given man's in-
trinsically vitiated nature, Augustine emphatically rejects efforts to es-
tablish the City of God as an actual sacred state. Such a utopian effort 
is not only doomed to failure but is also dangerously at odds with 
human nature (pp. 105-08). 
Walker concludes that Augustine's vision of the limited role of the 
state provides the foundation for a "principled argument against a 
politics of principle" (p. 111 ). Augustine's conclusions concerning the 
instability and indeterminacy of man's moral knowledge inspire a 
strong political and legal prudence (p. 114). Thus, politics and law 
can only play a marginal role in the salvation of man; they must focus 
20. The Manichaeans maintained a dualistic theory in which two ultimate principles, one 
good and the other evil, battled throughout eternity. See 2 F. CoPLESTON, A HlsTORY OF PHI-
LOSOPHY 56 (1962). They held that nature and reality were fundamentally void and evil, and 
thus provided no basis for moral knowledge. See pp. 109-10. The Academic Skeptics advocated 
a form of epistemological nihilism which denied the possibility of moral truths. See p. 91. In 
contrast, the "realists" of antiquity such as Plato, Aristotle, and the Pelegian heretics maintained 
that reality contained a true and knowable moral order. P. 109. 
21. See generally AUGUSTINE, CrrY OF Goo (M. Dods trans. 1950); AUGU511NE, CoNFES-
SIONS (H. Chadwick trans. 1991). 
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instead on the more mundane project of providing for temporal peace. 
Walker argues that this vision of government provides a moral basis 
for an almost modem vision of government moral neutrality (pp. 102, 
106). Here Walker may make Augustine into too much of a contem-
porary liberal, especially given Augustine's defense of the use of secu-
lar power to suppress the Donatist heretics of his day.22 Nonetheless, 
many scholars have found in Augustine the origins of the W estem 
secular state. 23 
Walker concludes that, while Augustine's philosophy underscores 
the inadequacy of conventionalism, his ontologically-inspired pru-
dence also reins in the potentially utopian ambitions of the moral real-
ists (pp. 137, 139-52). Augustine's prudence thus provides a moral 
justification for deference to convention and legal precedent (pp. 139-
52), for the partial separation of law and morality, and for a "certain 
semblance of neutrality on the part of the political order and its rule of 
law" (p. 115). 
Walker here offers a striking improvement over the nihilism of 
most contemporary constitutional scholars, while still recognizing the 
drawbacks of moral realism. Walker's analysis should be particularly 
relevant to judicial conservatives, since it provides an explicit moral 
basis for a degree of judicial restraint. Walker substantially improves 
upon the relativistic arguments traditionally relied upon to justify judi-
cial restraint.24 More generally, Walker's analysis provides new in-
sights into the moral justifications for the apparent "neutrality" of the 
traditional liberal state. 
Nevertheless, Walker's prudential justification for judicial restraint 
remains fundamentally underdeveloped. Initially, Walker's prudential 
arguments fail to account for the importance of precedent and consis-
22. See Dawson, St. Augustine and His Age, in ST. AUGUSTINE 1, 74 (1961). The Donatists 
were a group of North African Christians who rejected the Catholic Church for its association 
with the Roman Empire. Christopher Dawson writes that: 
[T)he Donatist movement was not only a spiritual protest against any compromise with the 
world; it also roused all the forces of social discontent and national fanaticism. The wild 
peasant bands of the Circumcellions, who roamed the country, with their war-cry of "Deo 
laudes," were primarily religious fanatics who sought an opportunity of martyrdom. But 
they were also champions of the poor and the oppressed, who forced landlords to en· 
franchise their slaves and free their debtors ...• 
Id. at 55-56. 
23. See, e.g., 2 F. CoPLESTON, supra note 20, at 104-05. Similarly, Dawson argues that, 
In the West ... St. Augustine broke decisively with this tradition [of sacred monarchies] by 
depriving the state of its aura of divinity and seeking the principle of social order in the 
human will. In this way the Augustinian theory, for all its otherworldliness, first made 
possible the ideal of a social order resting upon the free personality and a common effort 
toward moral ends. 
Dawson, supra note 22, at 77. 
24. In this respect, Walker's analysis is similar to that of Harry Jaffa, a conservative critic of 
Judge Bork and an advocate of natural rights-based adjudication. See Jaffa, The Closing of the 
Conservative Mind: Judge Robert H. Bork and Original Intent, NATL. REv., July 9, 1990, at 40; 
Jaffa, Judge Bork's Mistake, NATL. REV., Mar. 4, 1988, at 38. 
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tency in legal interpretation. As Dworkin would argue, Walker's justi-
fications for following precedent are primarily "pragmatic" or 
"strategic,"25 and fail to account for the authoritative value that 
judges and lawyers place on past judicial decisions and statutes. 
Walker tries to address these criticisms by claiming that the ontologi-
cal basis of Augustine's prudence provides a "deeper and more self-
conscious" version of judicial caution (p. 149). Furthermore, he notes 
that established conventions such as law can provide insights and a 
"source of clues" into the nature of true morality (p. 155). 
Walker's arguments fail, however, to establish a unique authority 
in the law itself. Walker does not adequately explain why positive law 
is different from such conventional sources of moral authority as phi-
losophy, religion, and common sense. While Walker's ideal judge de-
fers to the law as a prudential check on his ambitions and consults the 
law as a guide to true morality, decisionmakers often accord similar 
deference and authority to other conventional sources of morality. 
Thus, just because Walker's judge would be more cautious and defer-
ential doesn't make his decisions any more legal. Ultimately, the judi-
cial restraint imposed by Walker's prudence differs only in degree and 
not in kind from the caution advocated by the moral realists, since 
even these theorists admit to the value of caution and deference to 
precedent (pp. 54-55). 
These problems with Walker's thesis stem, in part, from his failure 
to develop adequately his prudence-based jurisprudence. While he ex-
plains the Augustinian origins of this prudence, he fails to elaborate on 
its content or relative weight. When does the immorality of a law start 
to outweigh a judge's prudential deference to convention? Do past 
legal decisions carry actual moral weight or are they merely guide-
posts for higher moral insights? Walker's analysis would benefit if he 
attempted to address some actual "hard cases."26 
A related problem with Walker's approach is his failure to differ-
entiate adequately between Augustine's philosophical and theological 
assumptions. Since much of Augustine's vision is intimately linked to 
the Hebrew-Christian scriptures,27 its appeal is substantially limited 
for those who do not share the faith. For the most part, Walker does 
not attempt to "translate" Augustine's philosophy into more relig-
iously neutral language. Perhaps to do so would destroy the funda-
mental insights that Augustine has to offer for constitutional thought. 
But if Walker cannqt adequately detach Augustine's philosophical in-
25. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 10, at 158-59, 162. 
26. For example, in their famous debates Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart discuss various hard 
cases resulting from a statute prohibiting "vehicles" in a public park. See Fuller, supra note 2, at 
663; Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 607 (1958). 
Dworkin takes a similar approach, using the question of emotional tort damages as a test for his 
theory of law as integrity. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 10, at 238-50. 
27. See 2 F. CoPLESfON, supra note 20, at 62-65. 
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sights from the saint's theological views, the value of the book's ap-
proach may be substantially limited. 
That having been said, it is important to note that the structure of 
Walker's project seems fundamentally correct. From a logical stand-
point, any prescriptive theory of interpretation must, almost by defini-
tion, justify itself on normative grounds. To base a constitutional 
theory on mere convention undermines the very project of interpreta-
tion. Nevertheless, pure moral realism seems to invite judicial abuse 
and legal uncertainty. Ultimately, some kind of middle course must 
be chosen which provides an adequate moral basis for legal interpreta-
tion while preserving the role for positive law as a unique source of 
authority. In this project, Walker's approach shares some basic simi-
larities with Dworkin's law as integrity project.28 Walker's Augustin-
ian solution suggests some important new lines of inquiry into the 
moral foundations of legal analysis. 
- Arthur J. Burke 
28. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 10, at 225·75. 
